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A Note on “New techniques for noninteractive zero-knowledge”
Zhengjun Cao1, Lihua Liu2,∗
Abstract. In 2012, Groth, et al. [J. ACM, 59 (3), 1-35, 2012] developed some new
techniques for noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) and presented: the first perfect
NIZK argument system for all NP; the first universally composable NIZK argument
for all NP in the presence of an adaptive adversary; the first noninteractive zap
for all NP, which is based on a standard cryptographic security assumption. These
solved several long-standing open questions. In this note, we remark that their basic
system is flawed because the prover can cheat the verifier to accept a false claim.
Thus, these problems remain open now.
Keywords: Noninteractive zero-knowledge proof, trapdoor key, bilinear groups with
composite order, subgroup decision problem.
1 Introduction
Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof in the common random string model, introduced
by Blum et al. [3], plays a key role in many constructions, including digital signatures [9],
E-voting [12], Shuffle [1], polynomial evaluation [2], arithmetic circuits [6, 7] and multiple-party
computation protocols. In 1988, Blum et al. [3] constructed some computational NIZK proof
systems for proving a single statement about any NP language. In 1991, they [4] presented
the first computational NIZK proof system for multiple theorems. These systems are based
on the hardness of deciding quadratic residues modulo a composite number. In 1998, Kilian
and Petrank [18] designed an efficient noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system for NP with
general assumptions.
In 1999, Feige et al. [8] developed a method to construct computational NIZK proof systems
based on any trapdoor permutation. Goldreich et al. [11] discussed the possibility of converting
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a statistical zero knowledge (SZK) proof into a NIZK proof. In 2001, Santis et al. [20, 21]
investigated the robustness and randomness-optimal characterization of some NIZK proof sys-
tems. In 2003, Sahai and Vadhan [19] presented an interesting survey on SZK. Groth et al.
[14, 15, 17] designed some linear algebra with sub-linear zero-knowledge arguments and short
pairing-based NIZK arguments. In 2015, Gentry et al. [10] investigated the problem of using
fully homomorphic hybrid encryption to minimize NIZK proofs.
At EUROCRYPT’06, Groth, et al. [13] designed a new NIZK proof system for plaintext
being 0 or 1 using bilinear groups with composite order. The refined version [16] was published
by J. ACM in 2012. The behind intractability is the subgroup decision problem introduced by
Boneh et al. [5]. Based on the basic homomorphic proof commitment scheme, they presented:
(1) the first perfect NIZK argument system for all NP; (2) the first universally composable NIZK
argument for all NP in the presence of an adaptive adversary; (3) the first noninteractive zap for
all NP, which is based on a standard cryptographic security assumption. These solved several
long-standing open questions.
In this note, we would like to remark that in their basic homomorphic proof commitment
scheme the prover has not to invoke the trapdoor key to generate witnesses. The mechanism was
dramatically different from the previous works, such as Blum-Feldman-Micali proof system [3]
and Blum-Santis-Micali-Persiano proof system [4]. We show that the prover, who is accessible to
the trapdoor key, can cheat the verifier to accept a false claim. Thus, these problems concerning
NIZK protocols remain open now.
2 Review of the basic homomorphic proof commitment scheme
Let GBGN be a randomized algorithm that on security parameter k poutputs (p, q,G,GT , e, g)
such that: (1) p, q are primes with p < q; (2) G,GT are descriptions of cyclic groups of order
n = pq; (3) e : G × G → GT is a bilinear map; (4) g is a random generator for G and
e(g, g) generates GT ; (5) group operations, deciding group membership and the bilinear map
are efficiently computable. Let Gq be the subgroup of G of order q.
The homomorphic proof commitment scheme based on the subgroup decision assumption
can be described as follow.
Perfectly binding key generation. Generate (p, q,G,GT , e, g) ← GBGN(1
k) and set n = pq.
Pick x← Z∗q, and set h = g
px. Let ck = (n,G,GT , e, g, h) and xk = (ck, q).
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Perfectly hinding key generation. Generate (p, q,G,GT , e, g) ← GBGN(1
k) and set n = pq.
Pick x← Z∗q, and set h = g
x. Let ck = (n,G,GT , e, g, h) and tk = (ck, x).
Commitment. To commit to message m ∈ Zp, pick r ← Zn and compute c = g
mhr.
Extraction. On a perfect binding key we can use xk = (ck, q) to extract m of length O(log k)
from c = gmhr by computing cq = (gmhr)q = (gq)m and exhaustively search for m.
Trapdoor opening. Given a commitment c = gmhr under a perfectly hiding commitment key
we have c = gm
′
hr−(m
′
−m)/x. So we can create a perfectly hiding commitment and open it to
any value we wish if we have the trapdoor key tk = (ck, x). It returns r′ = r − m
′
−m
x modn.
WI proof. Given m, r ∈ {0, 1} × Zn we make the WI proof for commitment to 0 or 1 as
π = (g2m−1hr)r.
Verification. To verify a WI proof π of commitment c containing 0 or 1, check
e(c, cg−1) = e(h, π)
It is easy to check its correctness because
e(c, cg−1) = e(gmhr, gm−1hr) = e(g, g)m(m−1)
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
e(g, h)(2m−1)re(h, h)r
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= e(g, g)m(m−1)
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
e(h, π)
Since m ∈ {0, 1}, we have e(c, cg−1) = e(h, π).
3 The proof commitment scheme is flawed
3.1 What is the true claim
Give c ∈ G, the prover claims that c is of the form gmhr for some (m, r) ∈ {0, 1} × Zn. This is
equivalent to check whether c or c/g is in the subgroup Gq.
If the trapdoor key q is available to the verifier, then it suffices to check that cq = 1 or
(c/g)q = 1. However, the trapdoor key q cannot be directly shown to the verifier. Therefore,
the prover has to produce some witnesses to convince the verifier of that c or c/g is indeed in
the subgroup Gq.
3.2 The prover can cheat the verifier to accept a false claim
Notice that the system does not specify that who is responsible for generating the system
parameters. If there is a third-party, Cindy, who generates the system parameters, then Cindy
is not fully trustable and she knows the trapdoor key. Otherwise, the presence of a fully trustable
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third party is incompatible with the general model of zero-knowledge proof. Therefore, the prover
can form an alliance with Cindy. All in all, the prover can access to the trapdoor key (p, q). In
this situation, we now show that the prover can cheat the verifier to accept a false claim.
The prover sets c = gα1hα2 , π = gβ1hβ2 , where α1, α2, β1, β2 are to be determined. Since
e(c, cg−1) = e(gα1hα2 , gα1−1hα2) = e(g, g)α1(α1−1)e(g, h)α1α2+α2(α1−1)e(h, h)α
2
2
e(h, π) = e(h, gβ1hβ2) = e(g, h)β1e(h, h)β2
it suffices for the prover to solve


α1(α1 − 1) = 0modn
2α1α2 − α2 = β1modn
α22 = β2modn
for those exponents.
Armed with the trapdoor key p, q, the prover computes k, ℓ using Extended Euclid Algorithm
such that
kq − ℓp = 1.
He then sets α1 = kq, picks β1 < n and computes α2 = β1(2kq − 1)
−1modn, β2 = α
2
2modn.
It is easy to check that the above values c, π pass the verification. Clearly, α1 = kq 6= 0, 1.
Besides,
(gα1)q = (gkq)q = (gℓp+1)q = gq 6= 1
namely gα1 6∈ Gq. Therefore, since h
q = (gpx)q = 1, there does not exist an integer α′ such that
gα1 = hα
′
. That means c = gα1hα2 cannot be eventually expressed as hw1 or ghw2 for some
integers w1, w2. Thus, the prover can cheat the verifier to accept a false claim.
4 Conclusion
We present an attack against the basic homomorphic proof commitment scheme proposed by
Groth et al. in 2012. The system seems secure if the trapdoor key is indeed not accessible to
the prover. But the assumption that the presence of a fully trustable third party is somewhat
incompatible with the general primitive of zero-knowledge proof, and makes the system itself
unsuitable to more broader applications.
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